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PHRONESIS part 1
Is current human consciousness an end point in the evolution of mind?
ABSTRACT: If the human mind is a product of evolution, is it not prudent to consider how and in what way 
it might evolve in the future? Given the order of magnitude that appears to distinguish the minds of mankind 
from those of its closest animal relative, how significant might a new level of mind evolution be and what 
would be its unique distinguishing features? In this paper, I present a reductive explanation of phenomenal 
experience and demonstrate its compliance with exhaustive philosophy criteria. Further extrapolation of the 
explanation leads to a theoretical framework that elucidates the distinguishing characteristics of the next 
evolutionary step of the human mind. The reductive explanation aligns closely with our understanding of the 
evolution of life on earth so that examination of the explanation is also open to multidisciplinary 
interpretation and discussion.
1. Overview
Consider the following: 
Light striking the eye’s retina differs from when it strikes any other surface. Instead of the light energy just 
interacting with the surface through absorption and reflection, the specialised and ordered structure that is the 
brain translates the light impulse, via the retinal nerve, into a neural format. Following conversion into its 
neural format, the light energy travels throughout the brain and is fed, filtered, conjoined, terminated, 
expressed etc. With multi-mechanisms like these, the brain transforms energy into temporal and spatial 
neural relational representations that generate the realisation of the structure's own existence as a physical 
body within the environment. In this way, the energy maintained within the entire system, leads to a 
recognition and development of an individual's 'concept of reality' based on the information it has collated 
via its senses (more on this later). 
The brain is a high level example of an evolved structure that dissipates various forms of energy in a 
controlled and ordered manner. But the brain is not the only physical structure that has the capacity to control 
the dissipation of energy. There are lower levels of structural organisation that dissipate energy in an ordered 
manner too. Importantly, these lower levels are related to or have a relational status with the higher levels. It 
is the nature of this relationship that I will identify and explain in a manner that will provide a reductive 
explanation of phenomenal experience.
There are two objectives to this paper:
1. Firstly, to introduce and outline a dynamic systems model which I call the 'Hierarchical Systems 
Theory', which provides a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience and an explanation of the 
evolutionary foundations behind consciousness; and 
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2. Secondly, to advance a possible future mind state by extrapolating its principles. 
We begin with an appraisal of the philosophy that indicates what requirements are necessary of a coherent 
reductive explanation of phenomenal experience. These stipulated requirements will be referenced 
throughout the main body of the paper. Following this is a brief historical perspective to the science that 
seeks to explain complex organic systems. Then, 'Hierarchical Systems Theory' (HST) is described in detail. 
The paper concludes with an extrapolation of a future mind state.
2. An appraisal of the philosophy that determines the necessary requirements of a reductive 
explanation of phenomenal experience 
The Philosophy of Consciousness and the Problem of Phenomenal Experience
Deciphering the requirements of an explanation of ‘consciousness’ is a discipline in itself because it is 
unclear as to what is being referred to when considering the question, ‘what is consciousness?’. This is 
evident when one considers the plethora of attempts to explain consciousness and explore the enigmatic 
features of phenomenal consciousness (e.g. Armstrong, 1968, 1984; Carruthers, 1996; Dennett, 1978, 
Flanagan, 1992; Gennaro, 1996; Kirk, 1994; Lycan, 1987, Nelkin, 1996; Rosenthal, 1986, 1993; Tye, 1995). 
Chalmers (1995) argues that there is a uniquely ‘hard problem’ in deciphering consciousness in that any 
theory must adequately explain the specific characteristics and the textural qualities of phenomenal 
experience. Some argue that such a problem does not exist, others that a reductive explanation is impossible 
(Chalmers, 1996, 1999; Chalmers & Jackson, 2001; Jackson, 1982, 1986; Levine, 1983, 1993, 2001; 
McGinn, 1991; Sturgeon, 1994, 2000), whilst Chalmers (1995) speculates in favour of a non-reductive 
explanation that would require the discovery of, an as yet, undiscovered psycho-physical entity or 
fundamental force with its own laws. Alternatively, some argue that reductive explanation is possible with 
claims by several to having already provided one (Carruthers, 2000a; Dennett, 1991; Dretske 1995; Lycan 
1996; Tye, 2000a).
What then, are the considered requirements of an adequate explanation of phenomenal experience? What 
follows is a distillation of ideas as to what is required to make a theory coherent:
1. Carruthers (2000a; also c.f. 2004) argues in favour of a reductive explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness that should,
1. explain how phenomenally conscious states have a subjective dimension; how they have feel; why 
there is something which it is like to undergo them; 
2. why the properties involved in phenomenal consciousness should seem to their subjects to be 
intrinsic and non-relationally individuated; 
3. why the properties distinctive of phenomenal consciousness can seem to their subjects to be 
ineffable or indescribable; 
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4. why those properties can seem in some way private to their possessors; and 
5. how it can seem to subjects that we have infallible (as opposed to merely privileged) knowledge of 
phenomenally conscious properties. 
2. Chalmers (1995) proposes that a coherent non-reductive theory of consciousness is necessary and that it 
must satisfy his three evaluative criteria. To paraphrase, these are as follows:
1. Criterion A, the double aspect theory of information principle, requires that information is 
fundamental to consciousness, and corresponds to physical and to phenomenal features that are 
isomorphic. (Section 7.3, para 4).
2. Criterion B, the principle of organisational invariance, states that any two systems with the same 
functional organisation will have qualitatively identical experiences. Examples of such systems might 
include computer systems. (Section 7.2, para 1).
3. Criterion C, the principle of structural coherence, requires that the processes that explain awareness 
link structurally to the basis of consciousness by determining the relationship between that of which 
we are aware (and can report upon) and that of which we experience. (Section 7.1, para 11) 
Crucial in the assessment of my 'Hierarchical Systems Theory', Chalmers states that an explanation of 
consciousness should explain the experience about which and with which humans are individually aware and 
report upon, and provide an appraisal of prevailing physical facts and show how these facts must lead to 
organisms that possess phenomenal experience.
3. Dowell (2007a) considers the arguments that both the analysis of phenomenal experience and reductive 
explanation is impossible using type-A and type-B physicalism methods. She does this by reviewing 
Jackson, Chalmers, and Gertler, on one side of the debate, and Block, Stalnaker, McLaughlin, and Hill on the 
other. Each offer a rival account of what, in the absence of analysis, would be sufficient to justify reductive 
explanation. Dowell (2007b) allays the concerns of the differing views by providing an alternative 
illustration of a strategy that she calls a type-C physicalism method, which demonstrates, importantly how 
phenomenal analysis is not necessary for an a priori entailment (e.g. the extrapolation of existing physical 
principles) to satisfy reductive explanation. This type-C physicalism is therefore, a deductive-nomological 
account explanation (Hempel, 1965; Carruthers, 2004, section 2.1). The Hierarchical Systems Theory may 
be interpreted as an example of a type-C method.
4. A type-C reductive explanation is one that Carruthers (2004) argues, is an ontic method that seeks to 
specify some significant part of a causal process and to describe the causal mechanism. Woodruff Smith 
(2001) too, seeks the principle aspects of a fundamental ontology, which he argues, should explore and 
explain the relationship between consciousness and, what he regards as the three key facets of consciousness 
namely evolution, physiology, and behaviour.
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Hierarchical Systems Theory (HST) is an example of a type-C method of reductive explanation, because it 
links uncontroversial physical facts to uncontroversial phenomenal conclusions. Whilst the reduction 
describes the processes that lead to the emergent property of phenomenal experience, there is an argument to 
say that it explains only the object of consciousness and the characteristics that define it but not individuated 
consciousnesses. In answer to this objection, Hierarchical Systems Theory explains how the first person must 
exist as an emergent property of brain activity, but does not explain the 'actual' perspective that defines any 
single individual. So, HST still allows for a coherent refinement of what might be 'unknowable', as of 
McGinn (1991), and provides a new perspective of the mind body problem. Furthermore, one can also make 
a case that HST provides a teleological reduction of intentionality in determining the necessary compulsive 
'conditions of satisfaction' (a case that I do not make here), which would provide the underpinning of any 
HST based artificial consciousness applications.
In summary, this reduction provides uniform consistency by showing an evolving systems-hierarchy that 
extrapolates from physics principles. Furthermore, it uniquely illustrates how the explanation can be 
theoretically and empirically evaluated, thereby dismantling all of Velmans’ (2001 c.f. conclusion) criticisms 
that reductive physicalism ignores both the first-person phenomenological evidence regarding the nature of 
consciousness and the third-person evidence about how it relates to a world described by physics. 
The theory also has bearing on First-order and High-order representational theories in that it formalises a 
dynamic hierarchical structure that facilitates and explains physiological and evolutionary connections. This 
answers questions posed by Carruthers (2000b) as to how and why transitions in the evolution of 
consciousness take place.
3. An historical perspective to the science that seeks to explain complex organic systems
3.1 The Science of Thermodynamics and the Problem of Order from Chaos
Schrödinger (1944) makes the observation that whilst the laws of physics “have a lot to do with the natural 
tendency of things to go over into disorder…. it is by avoiding the rapid decay into the inert state of 
‘equilibrium’ that an organism appears so enigmatic.” (Chap. 6, para 2 & 6). Superficially, it would seem that  
living organisms appear to contradict the second law of thermodynamics because life creates structure and 
order out of chaos. Despite the apparent paradox, Boltzmann (1886/1974) is clear that the evolution of 
ordered systems does not conflict with thermodynamic principles and Pieper (2000 para 2) clarifies the point 
by stating, “the synonymous use of the terms entropy and disorder represent a serious misunderstanding of 
thermodynamics.” Thirty years following Schrodinger's observation regarding the enigma of ordered 
lifeforms, Prigogine (1978), another Nobel laureate, was able to demonstrate in his theory of dissipative 
structures that self-organisation can evolve spontaneously even within chaotic environments. Indeed, 
Swenson (1988, 1989) maintains that under certain conditions, ordered flows of energy will maximise the 
rate at which a system satisfies the second law thereby making it more effective at dissipating energy than 
chaotic flows. 
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Despite the advances of work relating to Prigogine's theory of dissipative structures, Corning & Kline (1998) 
give an in depth critique of the applications of the second law of thermodynamics to multileveled structures 
like biological systems, making a distinction between order and functional organisation. What Corning & 
Kline allude to is that understanding systems dynamics requires understanding the function of systems 
structures, which is not possible through the application of thermodynamic laws alone.
More recently, there continues to be optimism that the scientific fields of systems theory and cybernetics 
might somehow provide fundamental principles to explain not just the order that arises spontaneously from 
the complexities and chaos of the environment, but many of the sophisticated characteristics of organic 
lifeforms too (e.g. Barab et al., 1999; Corning & Kline, 1998; Jorgensen & Svirezhev, 2004; Schneider & 
Kay 1994; Swenson, 1997).
3.2 General Systems Theory and the Problem of Information
Over thirty years before the first journal devoted to complex systems was to publish its first paper, 
Bertalanffy succeeded at introducing his General Systems Theory in the British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science (1950) and Human Biology (1951). From these seminal papers are two points of particular relevance 
to this paper:
1. The laws of thermodynamics apply to closed systems, but not to open systems - Importantly, the 
environment with which lifeforms interact, is open.
2. With complex systems such as living organisms, there is some aspect of 'self-regulation' or self-
organisation that entails feedback or the transfer of information.
A key to understanding systems behaviour therefore relates to the concept of information transfer and the 
way it is self-regulated:
• What is meant by the transfer of information?
• How does the information of one system relate or differ to another?
• In what way is information traded for stability?
• Why is the transaction process self-regulatory?
• Why is this a universal principle for all systems
• What are those universal principles? 
Adopting Bertalanffy's lead, Kuhn (1974) proposes that all systems tend toward equilibrium through 
communication (where communication translates as the exchange of information) and transaction (involving 
the exchange of "matter-energy"), and that a prerequisite for the continuance of a system, by controlled or 
uncontrolled means, is its ability to maintain a steady and stable state.
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To develop the thoughts of Kuhn further, if one assumes that system stability arises through the transaction 
of information by controlled or uncontrolled means and that this transaction is in some manner self-
regulatory, is it possible to describe a model that conclusively answers those key questions above relating to 
the regulation and transfer of information?
4. Introducing The Hierarchical Systems Theory
4.1 What is a system? 
A system is an open state that is composed of interacting and interdependent parts whose combined dynamic 
relationships determine coherent, stable functional behaviours: 
Any given system exists by virtue of its component dynamic stability because without stability the 
interacting parts cease to maintain their coherent systems behaviours thereby becoming separate entities. One 
might say that a system must demonstrate dynamic stability in order to define its existence. 
4.2 Systems stability and interaction
Coherent functional behaviours are conditional on system stability. Inevitably, any given environmental 
interaction has the capability of disrupting either system stability directly, or some of the interdependent 
parts upon which a system relies for its own stability. One might reasonably conclude that when a system 
interacts with elements within the environment, a process takes place that leads to a realignment of systems 
stability. This realignment may lead to two distinct types of reaction:
1. When the realignment of stability is ordered, a system demonstrates its structural function by 
actively dictating the nature of a stabilising reactive outcome. 
2. Alternatively, when the realignment of stability is disordered, a system’s response does not 
demonstrate its structural function, and the system passively acquiesces to a new reactive equilibrium. 
(More on these points later).
This realignment of stability may also lead to two distinct consequences:
1. Systems behaviours, be they ordered or disordered as of  point 1 and 2 above, arise from dynamic 
reactive structural re-evaluations. These re-evaluations always result in some form of stable state 
outcome, even should that state be brief and/or transitory.
2. Systems behaviours are indicative of the displacement or conversion of energy from one state to 
another. When the conversion of energy is ordered, one can define that conversion specifically as, the 
movement of  information. (More on these points later).
4.3 What is an hierarchical system?
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The Hierarchical Systems Theory states that under certain conditions, a system may comprise of 
interdependent parts that have an identifiable hierarchical status that has characteristics that are unique to 
that system's construct. Theoretically, any systems dynamic has the capacity to evolve a unique and formal 
relational systems hierarchy or a hierarchical systems dynamic. 
Before I provide a detailed exposition of an hierarchical system, what follows, are a couple of illustrative 
examples to explain further the difference between a standard system and an hierarchical system:
4.4 How does an hierarchical system differ from a standard system?
Standard systems evolution
Take a scenario where, for example, the structure of a system (S) reacts to a certain type of interaction in an 
ordered manner and a second type of interaction in a disordered manner. (We can label the former as 
interactions type-A and the latter as interactions type-B). In other words, accepting points 4.2 above, type-A 
interactions lead to the system demonstrating its structural function whilst type-B interactions lead to chaotic 
systems dysfunction. Subsequently, if system S’s reaction to a type-A or B interaction were coincidentally to 
lead to the modification of its structure such that it could then react to both type-A and B interactions in an 
ordered manner, that systems structure would have acquired a new capability. This capability would be self-
perpetuating because it would enable system S’s structure to stabilise interactive behaviours with both type-
A and B interactions. Furthermore, the structural reaction would inevitably be positively selective thereby 
indicating that system S, as with all standard systems, would demonstrate the potential to evolve over time 
and develop increasingly complex structures and functional behaviours.
Hierarchical systems evolution
A hierarchical systems structure arises under exceptional circumstances when the functional complexity of a 
system evolves to the point where some aspect of its functional dynamic becomes a separate yet dependent 
system state with its own unique class of environmental interaction: Given the same scenario above, consider 
a situation where system S evolves such that its systems function responds favourably to increasingly diverse 
types of interaction from type-A, B; and C through to type-Z. In doing so, standard system S becomes a 
complex systems structure because of its extensive array of ordered behavioural function. A hierarchical 
systems dynamic can then arise, if this complex behavioural array evolves its own unique subset of system-
to-environment interactions. (We can label these interaction types as type-A1 through to type-Z1). In 
response to this new class of interaction, a sub-structure of system S can evolve systems functions that are 
entirely distinct from the standard system S. What makes these systems functions hierarchical is that despite 
their behavioural independence to standard system S, their existence is still dependent on the coherence of 
system S interactions.
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The hierarchical systems dynamic that explains the phenomenon of experience that humans call 
consciousness
It is difficult to evaluate a theoretical illustration like this without concrete examples. Consequently, the main 
focus now is to analyse an actual example of a hierarchical system. The three main objectives to this analysis 
are to,
1. Give a clearer indication of what a hierarchical systems dynamic entails beyond the illustration 
given above;
2. Demonstrate the underlying unity of the Hierarchical Systems Theory and indicate how this unity 
explains great complexity; and
3. Provide a coherent reductive explanation of phenomenal experience by satisfying the necessary 
philosophical requirements.
5. Extrapolation of Hierarchical Systems Categories 1 to 4
5.1 Systems Category 1
 
Perception States
A compound atomic structure is an example of a system whose stability is dependent on its component 
atomic elements and they in turn are dependent on the stability of more fundamental atomic forces. 
It is said of atomic compounds that they react to elements within the environment. But when speaking of 
systems structures, of which an atomic compound is an example, one must first consider that they interact 
with the environment. To say that a system and its environment interact, rather than react, is to acknowledge 
that there is a two way process where both parties accommodate the other to some extent and where some 
form of exchange of energy takes place between the two. Consider the following:
The interaction between a system and its environment is a process through which (per) a system's structure 
embraces (capere, to seize or to take hold) and then reacts to the experience. 
In this statement, the use of the term interaction, allows for the proposition that a system ‘embraces’ or ‘takes 
hold’ of its experiences before the institution of reaction. Thus one can continue with the following:
When a system experiences and then reacts, its 'interactive' behaviour is demonstrating environmentally 
perceptive characteristics (i.e. Where the term perceptive is derived from per-capere, meaning; through 
which the system seizes or takes hold).
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This is an unconventional definition of perception because it applies equally to inanimate systems structures 
as it does to the more usual references of those experiences gathered by the specialised sensory organs of 
living organisms. The concept of mutual interaction between system and environment allows for the notion 
of a system embracing experience. 
But this is not all there is to this definition of perception. Recalling section 4.2, it was stated,
When a system interacts with elements within the environment, a process takes place that leads to a 
realignment of systems stability. This realignment may lead to two distinct types of reaction:
1. When the realignment of stability is ordered, a system demonstrates its structural function by 
actively dictating the nature of a stabilising reactive outcome. 
2. Alternatively, when the realignment of stability is disordered, a system’s response does not 
demonstrate its structural function, and the system passively acquiesces to a new reactive equilibrium.
What follows is an examination of the two distinct types of perceptive behaviours:
The Distinction between Passive and Active Perception States
Passive perception - When a system, such as an atomic compound, interacts with its environment in an 
ordered manner, its behaviours characterise the system's coherent function. When behaviours do not 
characterise a system’s coherent function, then the system is not in control of the reactive equilibrium that 
must ensue following that particular interaction between system and environment. When this occurs, the 
system may either be permanently compromised structurally or cease to exist. 
Permanent structural compromise invariably leads to permanent systems dysfunction, but it can also result 
coincidentally, in functional advances that influence the evolution of that system's structure. However, under 
these circumstances, one might say that the evolution of the system is ‘outside’ of its control. Structural 
advances only occur when the system’s function has been initially negated and where there is no systems 
control over the re-acquisition of stability. 
But imagine if a system could be capable of retaining active involvement in the evolution of its systems 
structure even during disordered and dysfunctional interaction. How could such a systems structure be 
possible?
Well, one can appreciate that increasingly complex compounds can evolve as an accidental consequence of 
environmental interactions and that this could lead to the evolution of some special systems characteristics. 
What process or systems characteristic could evolve, whose functional behaviour would ensure that it 
maintain active involvement in its chaotic or disordered environmental interactions?
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Active perception - Unlike other systems structures that merely react, there is a system type that uniquely, 
actively dictates its structure’s reactive capability, even under the duress of chaotic and disordered 
environmental interactions. 
One of these system types belongs to the polynucleotide family and include ribonucleic acid and 
deoxyribonucleic acid:
A system’s structure is a physical representation of its systems construct. If a system’s structure can replicate, 
then that systems construct is expressed in perpetuity.
The ability to replicate affords a structure a unique characteristic and status because structural replicates 
determine the nature of their particular individual system’s development through successive generations, 
even after the parent structure dissipates and ceases to exist.
A replicating system encapsulates its perceptions actively by enabling the progressive evolution of its 
particular structure. Environmental interactions do not just happen and then end as is the case with passively 
perceptive systems, but have an impact on a replicating system’s structure that transcends an individual 
structure’s lifespan through its successive generations. A replicating system is adaptive, whilst other types of 
systems are merely reactive. 
Actively perceptive systems seek stable structural adaptation
Whilst the requirements of a passively perceptive system are merely to seek structural stability during 
environmental  interaction, the structure of an individual replicating system represents a snapshot in time of 
an evolving systems state whose requirements are to acquire and maintain a stable reactive adaptation. 
Consequently, for each new generation, the interactions of replicating systems lead to structural mutations, 
which represent new stable adaptations of that particular system over time.
The oldest replicating system found on earth is a 3.5 billion year old fossilised bacterium, identified in 1993 
by Schopf (1999). Following the first evolutionary explosion of the Big Bang, but ignoring the evolutionary 
effects of early phase transitions that defined the nature of matter and space, the capacity to duplicate marks 
the start of a second momentous evolutionary event. Coren (2001) is an independent proponent of this 
descriptive analogy and suggests coincidently in his analysis of the empirical evidence for a law of 
information growth, that there could be a relationship between cosmological evolution, life on earth, human 
culture, and thermodynamics. There is no reason to suppose that the capability to replicate has only 
happened on earth, and Bennett et al. (2003) conclude that it has probably occurred on thousands of other 
planetary systems. This momentous evolutionary event began on earth through passive perception and the 
unintentional evolution of compound atomic structures that could replicate.
5.2 Systems Category 2.
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 Consciousness States
In the previous 'Systems Category 1.' section, the intention was to introduce a few key concepts:
1. The first was to introduce the notion that perception is not a characteristic limited to 'living' 
organisms that 'sense' the environment, but that all systems structures that engage with and react to the 
environment are also per-ceptive.
2. In order to clarify point 1, it was necessary to determine in what way and by what means one could 
distinguish the perception of systems that might be regarded as 'not alive' with that of living 
organisms. 3. This distinction is explained with the concept of passive and active perception states.
4. Finally, it was necessary to describe the mechanisms behind the passive and active perception states 
and explain how and why they relate and naturally progress from one to the other during the course of 
evolution.
5. In conclusion to category 1, there is a description of actively perceptive systems as structures 
striving uniquely for a 'stable structural adaptation'. 
In the following section, an examination of the unique characteristics of category 2 organisms begins with an 
exploration of the concept of information as it relates to complex organic structures. In doing so, the 
intention is to demonstrate how Hierarchical Systems Theory complies firstly with Carruthers' requirements 
of an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of consciousness, 2.1.1 and 2.1.3 above, specifically 
regarding the subjective dimension of "phenomenal states" and its ineffable or indescribable nature, secondly 
with Chalmers' criterion A double aspect theory of information principle, which requires that information is 
fundamental to consciousness and corresponds to physical and to phenomenal features that are isomorphic, 
and finally with Chalmers' criterion B principle of organisational invariance, which states that any two 
systems with the same functional organisation will have qualitatively identical experience:
The concept of information as it relates to complex organic structures
The unique replicative characteristic of actively perceptive category 1 systems ensures the evolution of 
increasingly complex structural adaptations. 
Consider the following statement:
Structure and behaviour are the physical embodiment of a complex organic system's 'understanding of the 
environment'.
Clearly, in the context of this statement, understanding is not of the kind that one might associate with 
reasoning or informed decision making. Rather, it is by virtue of the complex structures and behaviours 
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themselves, that organic systems structures demonstrate that they possess a certain understanding of the 
environment:
For example, the complex nature of creating sugars from light, water, and carbon dioxide indicate that the 
evolved biochemical structures of plants exhibit the knowledge that enables photosynthesis to take place. 
Accepting that organic systems have a physiologically encoded understanding of their environment or 
knowledge about the environment, can be expressed alternatively by saying that systems structures are a 
form, or type, of information construct.
This is relevant to Chalmers' criterion, where information is necessarily a fundamental feature of a coherent 
explanation of consciousness (1995, section 7.3, criterion A). As here, Dennett (1995a) also argues that 
adaptation is a form of knowledge. He suggests that any functioning structure carries implicit information 
about the environment in which the function operates. Dennett does not then conclude the following:
It is with (con, with) its biochemical structure that a biological system expresses its knowledge (scire, to 
know). Alternatively; biological systems structures are con-scious.
This definition is emphatically not a call to panpsychism, but granted, the formal definition is over 
simplistic. After all, in its present form it offers no insight into what we commonly associate with what it is 
to be conscious. Furthermore, the definition may feel intuitively wrong, because knowledge is more readily 
associated only with thinking processes derived from neural mechanisms. However, there is more to this 
definition than at first meets the eye (c.f. below). What the definition does at this stage, is simply link 
information to a basic interpretation of consciousness. This provides the foundations from which it will be 
demonstrated how consciousness is an emergent property.
An incorrect inference from the definition might be that any structured series of biochemical processes, for 
example, chemical pumps, feedback mechanisms, inhibitors, and receptors, can be regarded as 'conscious' 
because they encode information that relates to their system's interaction with the environment. However, it 
is the replicating system and its interdependent parts that are conscious according to this definition, not each 
of the interdependent parts themselves. In order to tighten the definition further one must re-state with the 
following:
A systems structure is conscious if its component parts are the intrinsic interdependent elements that define a 
system's structure and when the system's behaviours arise from the structure's adaptation to environmental 
stimuli. 
This clarification creates the necessary division between organisms that one might say, possess any degree of 
consciousness and manmade allopoietic structures, of which thermostats (Chalmers, 1994), buckets of water 
(Searle, 1983) or current computerised applications are examples. Manmade allopoietic structures are 
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artificially organised constructs designed to give the appearance of or to mimic the behave of coherent 
uniform systems. But a thermostat or bucket of water is no more a systems structure than, for example, a 
person and the house in which they live. Both house and person are organised structures, but putting them 
together does not create a uniform system. When the person is in the house, that individual’s environmental 
parameters are controlled and restricted by the house, but combining the two does not constitute a systems 
structure. Computer software likewise is constructed by combining non-relational elements to create 
organised syntactic actions, but these characteristics are present in the absence of a functional systems 
construct. Searle (1980) argues a similar point with his Chinese Room Argument thought experiment. The 
thought experiment starts by supposing that if we were to give a program that gives a computer the ability to 
carry on an intelligent conversation in written Chinese to an English speaker, and they were to execute the 
instructions of the program by hand, then, in theory, the English speaker would also be able to carry on a 
conversation in written Chinese. However the English speaker would not be able to understand the 
conversation. So, Searle concludes, a computer executing the program would not understand the 
conversation either.
The intention so far, has been to describe a relationship between systems structure and knowledge thereby 
providing only a preliminary account of how information relates to our initial definition of consciousness. 
This relationship is necessary for the theory to comply with the first part of Chalmers’ double aspect theory 
of information principle, which is that information is fundamental to consciousness (c.f. 2.1 above - Criterion 
A). The second part of Chalmers' double aspect theory of information principle (Criterion A) states that 
information corresponds to physical and to phenomenal features that are isomorphic. It is to this second part 
of the principle that attention turns in the following section which clarifies the previous definition of 
consciousness:
Information acquisition and the distinction between passive and active consciousness states
As stated previously, when a system interacts with the environment it will either maintain system stability 
and demonstrate its structural function by behaving in an ordered manner, that is, in a manner consistent with 
that system's structure, or the system's dynamic will reacquire stability in a disordered manner whereby the 
system's structure and system's integrity is compromised. We can explore this concept in relation to 
consciousness as follows:
Replication and mutation are processes that ensure that a system's physiology adapts to the environment over 
time, as of category 1 organisms. However in these instances, it is not its replicating structure but 
environmental selection, that determines the nature of the knowledge that a structure’s physiology acquires 
from one generation to the next. A replicating organic structure does not have the capability of dictating the 
means by which it acquires complex environmental knowledge. In other words, a replicating system acquires 
information only passively, over generations. Thus, when reaffirming the previous definition of 
consciousness, i.e. that it is with (con, with) its biochemical structure that a biological system expresses its 
knowledge (scire, to know), we see with clarity that the conscious state of a replicating organism is static 
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because it acquires knowledge not as a function of its system's dynamic, but entirely by accident over 
generations. This dilutes the definition of consciousness significantly until one acknowledges its active form 
or state:
There is an active capability whereby a complex organism can actively influence the acquisition of its 
knowledge. This state has evolved unintentionally in response to the survival advantages afforded by the 
structural adaptations of category 1 systems structures. A system acquires this active capability when it has 
the facility to immediately and directly evaluate environmental conditions. Such capability enables its 
individuals to instantly adapt their behaviour in light of their environmental understandings, rather than rely 
on innate responses and evolving physiological adaptations. This active state is effected by the biochemical 
mechanisms of the neural networks and sensory organs of animals.
A neural network is a biochemical structure that is capable of encoding knowledge of environmental 
experience. The significant difference between the knowledge that neural networks acquire over other forms 
of physiologically structured knowledge, is that understandings about the environment that are encoded by 
neurones can evolve spontaneously and instantly in response to localised experiences. Spontaneous 
responses to the environment potentially have the benefit of enabling behavioural rather than evolutionary 
adaptation.
Actively conscious systems seek a stable understanding
Although interactive neural processes evolve from the replicating mechanisms of category 1 systems 
structures, their systems functions are uniquely distinctive.  
An important characteristic of any systems structure is that its dynamic interdependent parts must be able to 
maintain stability for the systems structure to exist (c.f. 4.1 above). Applying this principle to category 2; 
neurally encoded understandings of the environment represent a stable systems state. However, 
environmental conditions have a continually destabilising effect on neurally encoded understandings. Thus 
there is a constant realignment of the stability of the understandings that neural structures encode in response 
to environmental interaction. This desire for systems stability is what creates the semantic derivatives for all 
a system structure's syntactic mechanism. This derivation is the feature that is lacking in existing 
computational modelling of artificial intelligence (Searle, 1980) but is what is required to determine the 
macro-intentionality necessary for the functional operation of an artificially conscious system. An artificial 
system modelled in this manner, would not apply algorithmic calculations that have a finite number of steps 
or that would derive solutions using logic gates. Instead, such systems would apply the conditions of 
satisfaction relating to the requirement for spontaneous realignments of stable understandings.
Analysis of behaviours or of mechanisms of thought in themselves, give no insight into consciousness. 
Rather, it is the intentionality that determines the behavioural observations and the application of suitable 
mechanisms. Hierarchical Systems Theory provides the necessary understanding of those intentions in terms 
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of a system's demands for stability, which is why I stated in section 2 above that one can make a case that 
HST provides a teleological reduction of intentionality which would provide the underpinning of any HST 
based artificial consciousness applications.
The effect of  spontaneous realignments of understanding
A constantly changing environment ensures that neurally encoded understandings of the environment are in 
permanent flux. This fluctuating neural description of the environment does have an effect. One might 
describe that neural effect, which is propagated in realtime, as 'environmental sensation' or in Kant's 
terminology, 'intuition' (see 'Comparative evaluation and Kant' below). The following commentary attributes 
the phenomenon of feeling to this sensation:
As a defining statement, one can say that phenomena of feeling are a neural effect brought about by the 
realignment of stable understandings (c.f. next paragraph). 
To qualify this statement what is meant by 'stable understandings' and by 'phenomena of feeling'?
The term 'stable understandings' is interpreted broadly as any accurate evocation of knowledge, be it accrued 
or experienced. This neural 'knowledge' can consist of great complexity in experiential evaluation and in 
neural processing but does not utilise any conceptual thought. That there is no conceptual thought but a much 
neural activity explains the ineffable characteristic of the phenomenon of feeling. (c.f. Carruthers' 
requirements of an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of consciousness, 2.1.1 and 2.1.3 above, 
regarding the subjective dimension of "phenomenal states" and its ineffable or indescribable nature). This 
thesis provides an alternative explanation to Kant's view that judgements of taste are non-conceptual in 
derivation. 
The term 'phenomenon of feeling' in this context, is not that which one might associate with human concepts 
of ‘what it is to have feelings’. Feeling here refers to an effect arising from a process of restabilising neural 
responses. In itself, the effect has no experiential or even contextual status. In other words, the feelings can 
happen prior to the individual forming any correlation with its thoughts or knowledge. Experiential status 
develops only when there are associations between 'that which is felt' and its causal internal and/or external 
environment. When these associations do take place there is a potential for comparative experiential 
evaluation (see 'Comparative evaluation and Kant' below). Notably therefore, and as with Kant, comparative 
experiential evaluation is driven by feeling and is not conceptual. On first thought, associative processes are 
what appear to drive the actively conscious to adapt their behaviour in the light of experience. However, 
what actually drives behaviour is the need for stable behavioural adaptation.
The HST model explains how information or knowledge can correspond to physical and to phenomenal 
features that are isomorphic, as required of the second part of Chalmers criterion A (1995, c.f. 2.1 above). 
The explanation is much more satisfactory than the speculative ideas proposed by Chalmers whose concepts 
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are routed in a problematic mind body duality: "The double-aspect principle stems from the observation that 
there is a direct isomorphism between certain physically embodied information spaces and certain 
phenomenal (or experiential) information spaces" (1995, section 7.3).
Comparative evaluation and Kant
The term comparative evaluation is described equivalently by Kant (1781/1922) as follows:
Now, when I draw a line in thought, or if I think the time from one noon to another, or if I 
only represent to myself a certain number, it is clear that I must first necessarily 
apprehend one of these manifold representations after another. If I were to lose from my 
thoughts what precedes, whether the first parts of a line or the antecedent portions of time, 
or the numerical unities representing one after the other, and if, while I proceed to what 
follows, I were unable to reproduce what came before, there would never be a complete 
representation, and none of the before-mentioned thoughts, not even the first and purest 
representations of space and time, could ever arise within us. (p. 102)
Such evaluations of concurrent processes in time that humans and animals create on a continual basis, whilst 
awake, are not conceptual in origin nor dependent on the phenomena of experience, this is agreed. However, 
in his description, Kant omits a vital aspect of the process. He talks only of those events that precede the 
present. But both the evaluative mechanisms of conceptual and non-conceptual thought entail the 'projection 
of possibilities', to varying degrees of sophistication. How else might a dog catch a ball or a bird land on a 
twig unless they project a line of possible outcomes in anticipation of the present. This process is what 
creates behavioural free-flow of the kind not observed in many erratic (innate) insect behaviours. This is a 
significant feature of human conceptual and aesthetic processes.
What HST indicates of 'feeling' and its correct interpretation
Thinking, comparative evaluation, or being knowledgeable about experience do not give an animal a mind’s 
eye view, inner wisdom, or self-knowing concept.
Consider the nature of communication in an animal that is only actively conscious of experience. In this 
state, an animal can express itself only by communicating its innate responses to stimuli and by 
communicating some form of expression regarding the phenomenon of its feelings:
The evolution of the communications of feelings and their relationship to environmental experience can lead 
to increasing complex social behaviours and to distinctive individual and social stances. It is these 
behaviours and stances that humans interpret as 'emotions' using their unique and particular conceptual 
framework. But for a category 2 animal, there remain no defined realisations as to the significance of any 
given feeling regarding its expression or interpretation, or any particular insights regarding the relationship 
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between an expression and learnt associations. In the absence of conceptual representation, an animal such as 
this cannot begin to communicate any form of conceptual understanding or form a view as to what such an 
expression means 'emotionally'. Consequently, this phenomenal state of being actively conscious of 
perception does not embody the notion of what it is to be a human that is aware of the phenomenon of 
experience.
The complications of the human perspective regarding feeling are due to the reasoning that arises from its 
conceptual rationale. In this vein, Gunther (2004,) argues, “by introspecting [italics added] on what we feel, 
we learn to recognise what emotional attitude we’re experiencing.” (p. 44) This view is shared by de Sousa 
(2003) who suggests, “the specific nature of my emotion’s formal object is a function of my appraisal 
[italics added] of the situation.” (p. 1). Introspection and appraisal (as italicised) are distinct human attributes 
that alter interpretations of the status of feeling on the one hand, and emotion on the other. In support of this, 
research by Nielsen (1998), and the reassessment of Damasio (1994, 1999), indicates that human creative, 
reasoning, and problem solving processes utilise the evaluation and assessment of emotions rather than 
purely the emotions themselves. Kaszniak (2001) also highlights research to show that functional aspects of 
emotion operate outside "conscious awareness".
Artificial consciousness and the principle of organisational invariance
The principle of organisational invariance (c.f. 2.2 Chalmers' criterion B) states that any two systems with 
the same functional organisation will have qualitatively identical experiences. Theoretically, a hierarchically 
based systems-model founded on the principles established by this paper would create a self-perpetuating 
artificial state whose functional organisation would generate structures with qualitatively identical 
experiences to conscious animals. This is the case because the theory provides the necessary intentionality 
that underpins the causal mechanism that instantiates the necessary syntactic neural mechanism, (as required 
of successful artificial intelligence applications according to Searle, 1980). Empirically, the duplication of 
this intentionality, which is derived from the need for systems stability within the hierarchy of categories, is 
necessary in proving compliance with Chalmers’ principle of organisational invariance (criterion B). In 
principle HST does hypothesise that artificial consciousness is attainable. 
Active consciousness and its impact on evolution
The physiological impact of active consciousness is considerable because it alters adaptive behavioural 
parameters. These parameters influence rates of cerebral expansion and physiological development:
In their analysis of complex systems, Hinton & Nowlan (1987) demonstrate that “learning organisms evolve 
much faster than their nonlearning equivalents”(p. 495). Maynard Smith (1987) also argues that learning 
alters the parameters of evolution. Complin (1997), who examines the mechanics of adaptation using 
computational experiments and a wide array of literature from biology and evolutionary computation, 
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concludes that learning is a mechanism that leads to the extension of the boundaries of behavioural 
adaptation. 
Unsurprisingly, the ordered and disordered systems dynamic, which led to the emergence of animals that 
were actively conscious of perception, marks the beginning of a third evolutionary explosion. This explosion 
began when multicellular organisms first developed the capability of experiential comparison and evaluation 
in wormlike animals of the phylum Annelida, about 540 million years ago. Initially, a basic form of chemical 
memory and evaluation fuelled a physiological explosion that followed from the expansion and 
specialisation of sensory organs and neural network mechanisms. This alternative explanation that 
Hierarchical Systems Theory provides, presents coherent and unified answers to the questions that Hameroff 
(1998) raises in relation to the Cambrian evolutionary explosion. According to fossil records, Hameroff 
states, life on earth originated about 4 billion years ago, but evolved only slowly for about 3.5 billion years 
during the pre-Cambrian period. Then, in a rather brief 10 million years beginning about 540 million years 
ago, a vast array of diversified life abruptly emerged during the period known as the "Cambrian explosion."
5.3 Systems Category 3. 
Awareness States
The key points from the previous category 2 section are that,
1. Systems structures are a form, or type, of information construct.
2. The underlying function of the category 2 consciousness mechanism is to maintain stable knowledge. 
3. One of the by-products of the mechanism is the creation of the phenomena of feeling. 
4. Evaluations and associations between the phenomena of an individual’s feelings and its experiences 
leads to learning, where learning can be defined as the ability to make associations between the 
restabilising processes that generate feeling phenomena and the causal environment.
5. This complex neural mechanism requires the rapid comparison and prioritisation of experiential neural 
events upon whose coherence an organism’s survival may benefit.
6. For a category 2 animal, there remain no defined realisations as to the significance of any given feeling 
regarding its expression or interpretation, or any particular insights regarding the relationship between an 
expression and learnt associations.
In the following section, the relationship between consciousness and evolution, physiology, and behaviour is 
extended further. This is necessary to strengthen the case for, what Woodruff Smith (2001) regards as, the 
principle aspects of a fundamental ontology (c.f. section 2.4 above). Furthermore, HST increasingly 
establishes Carruthers (2000a; also c.f. 2004) requirements (2.1.1.to 2.1.5) of a reductive explanation. This 
section is primarily of interest because of the explanations that the unifying principles of Hierarchical 
Systems Theory will provide for a multitude of unique human characteristics. There will be insightful 
explanations of language, emotion, creativity, and social behaviours:
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On the evolution of passive and active conceptual realisations
In the previous category 2, the suggestion is that animals have the capability of modifying behaviour in an 
ordered manner. This occurs when there is a systems structure whose existence compels the comparative 
evaluation of experience. Cognitive fluency facilitates this capability. Consequently, increasingly 
sophisticated cognitive function evolves because of its potential survival advantages, but obviously, 
organisms are not in direct control of this evolutionary process. The evolution of increased cognitive 
capability is incidental.
Additionally, an increasingly complex cognitive capability enables neural mechanisms to compare, not just 
the relationship between the phenomenon of experience and feeling, but the relationship between the 
phenomenon of experience and learning too, where the ability to learn is determined by the ability to make 
associations between the restabilising processes that generate feeling phenomena and the causal 
environment. One can consider the dynamics of this heightened neural mechanism as a systems construct 
and structure in its own right.
As with previous examples, when a system interacts, it will either maintain system stability and demonstrate 
its structural function by behaving in an ordered manner or the system's dynamic will reacquire stability in a 
disordered manner in which case the system's structure passively acquiesces to a restabilising reactive 
outcome:
In category 3, when understandings between the phenomenon of experience and learning are disordered, 
understandings are not recognised in terms of their relationship to the process of learning. There is no 
systematic interpretation of understandings and consequently, no conception of what understandings mean in 
the context of reality. In this situation, any potential conceptual realisations acquiesce and are but fleeting. 
Fleeting conceptual realisations can be observed in non-human animals. This notion is remarkably consistent 
with Kant's thoughts as described in a letter to Herz:
[If I had the mentality of a sub-human animal, I might have intuitions but] I should not be able 
to know that I have them, and they would therefore be for me, as a cognitive being, absolutely 
nothing. They might still... exist in me (a being unconscious of my own existence) as 
representations..., connected according to an empirical law of association, exercising influence 
upon feeling and desire, and so always disporting themselves with regularity, without my 
thereby acquiring the least cognition of anything, not even of these my own states. (Bennett, 
1966, p. 104)
My Hierarchical Systems Theory explains fully why Kant's intuitive ideas expressed here are implicitly 
correct. But the Hierarchical Systems Theory enables us to delve deeper:
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If the neural system responsible for under’tanding evolves to a level of sophistication whereby it begins to 
develop an evaluative process that actively establishes a neural systems state that relates phenomenal 
experience with learning itself, then that systems state becomes an ordered structured mechanism in its own 
right.
Recognitional concepts and the emergent appreciation of needs, emotions, and feelings
An ordered category 3 mechanism recognises and identifies a relationship between learning and experience. 
What is the significance of this relationship?
To recognise a relationship between learning and experience is to develop a conception of reality's functional 
relevance: 
For example, any animal may learn or find out by accident, that apples fall from trees, but only by 
recognising this in a conceptual framework can that animal reason, as might a human, that throwing a stick at 
a juicy apple in a tree that is beyond reach, might bring the apple down to within its grasp. In fact the human 
can apply the conceptual principle to scenarios where the object of reference is not the subject of their 
immediate need or desire. Such conceptual understandings are conferred only through evaluating the 
associations between learnt understandings. (c.f. Loar (1990) Carruthers (2000a), and Tye (2000b) on 
phenomenal concepts).
In animals, learning and feelings are a derivative of complex associations. However, animals need not 
develop a realisation as to the significance of any given association. To do so, is to recognise the functional 
nature of that association. For example, an animal may learn that putting a stick in a tree crack and twiddling 
it about reveals a grub that satisfies its hunger. However, it has not made a conceptual association regarding 
sticks and satisfaction. To do this, it must make an association between objects that, in general, can function 
as tools for a variety of purposes to achieve a myriad of satisfying outcomes. Such a realisation is what leads 
to the development of generalised, and ultimately creative, concepts about tools in general and satisfaction. 
The proposal is that a complex interdependent conceptual map evolves from a realisation of objective 
functional properties in view of the emergent appreciation of an individual's desires, feelings and 
understandings. These come to form an individual human's recognitional concepts. The Hierarchical Systems 
Theory explains that the process relies on several systems layers:
1. Firstly, it relies on the ordered evolution of structures that stabilise experiential reaction.
2. Secondly, it relies on the ordered evaluation of the phenomenon of feeling and experience.
3. Thirdly, it relies on the ordered recognition of the phenomenon of learning and experience.
Fundamental concepts
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Concepts are not static for any given individual, but evolve from an early age. As they form, they do so in 
direct correlation with those environmental properties that induce desires and feelings. These actual 
environmental properties about which humans have desires, feelings and concepts, are spatial and temporal. 
Thus the sense of the spatial and the temporal are entwined with the concept that time and space exist and 
that experiences take place within its rich tapestry.
The concepts of space or time are fundamentally about relations between particular objects, within a world 
view about which an individual is phenomenally conscious. Consequently, concepts do not have to be 
conceived within a verbal language. A concept can be based on any 'relation of types'. It is these relation of 
types that determine the relationships between of the extrinsic properties of all known things, but which can 
never determine the intrinsic nature of things in themselves. 
If I close my eyes and imagine the room in which I sit, my verbal and artistic languages are limited in 
defining the conceptual object of that space, but I can speak about the atmosphere in terms of how I feel 
emotionally about the space, and I can speak about perceptual content in a retrospective and colourfully 
evocative way. Thus my aesthetic experience is divided into different elements that I can decipher 
imaginatively if a little inaccurately. But the image in my imagination is interpretative, when I try to 
conceive of its elements and speak about them. If I am unable to conceive of them, as might a nonhuman 
animal, the space and the time is not represented conceptually. This is not to say that an animal is not capable 
of imagining contents contextually, it just does so without a concept of their relations. Note, concepts do not 
have to be conceived within a verbal language. A concept can be based on any 'relation of types'. It is these 
relations of types that determine the identities of the extrinsic properties of all known things, but which can 
never determine the intrinsic nature of things in themselves. 
 
The emergence of the phenomenon of reality
There is one concept that is more profound than any other and that is the recognition of the phenomenon, 
reality. I say that it is profound, because it is by recognising the phenomenon of reality that an individual 
human comes to recognise itself as a conceptual being that exists as part of that spatial and temporal world 
view. This recognition leads to an emerging identification of the concept of self and to an active development  
of an awareness of the conscious state. In the grand scheme of a personal identity, an emerging conceptual 
map generates concepts about phenomena and ultimately to the recognition of phenomenal experience as a 
'condition' of the self. The same is expressed by | (1781/1922), in 'Of the synthesis of recognition in 
concepts' (para. 10):
...the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a 
consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all phenomena according to 
concepts, that is, according to rules, which render them not only necessarily reproducible, but 
assign also to their intuition an object, that is, a concept of something in which they are 
necessarily united. (p. 108)
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Languages are a by-product
Being actively aware of the conscious state has a powerful effect on communication. Whilst the 
communication of only emotional attitudes in category 2 conscious animals can involve complex sounds and 
gestures, the communication of conceptual reality in category 3 humans is an entirely different proposition: 
The construction of a conceptual realisation is what compels a human to formulate any suitable framework 
that can effectively communicate it. That universal suitable framework of languages is a grammar that 
facilitates the identification and relation between the objects and functions relevant to the conceived reality. 
Consequently, an individual’s language develops in response to its maturing concepts and their descriptive 
relevance:
Here in lies a coherent and far more plausible alternative interpretation of the findings that led Chomsky 
(1988) to suggestion that language arises through a realisation in the brain of an innate language faculty, or 
“language acquisition device” that switches on during language development. Hierarchical Systems Theory 
explains that language and its structural constructs are merely an intrinsic by-product of the dynamics arising 
from being actively aware of consciousness. Language arises from the compulsion that individuals have to 
persuasively communicate their stable concept of reality. 
This is not to say that communicating conceptual reality is the only function of language:
 
In category 2, it is the expression of feeling rather than language that is the by-product. Feeling can lead to 
learning, if an animal can make an associate between any given feeling and the experience that caused it. 
This is the added benefit or potential of the category 2 state. Similarly, in category 3, the by-product of 
language as an instrument for the expression of conceptual reality, has further developmental potential. This 
potential is realised through the association between concepts of reality and aspects of creative thought, and 
aspects of social and environmental influence, which language grants the individual and his ‘tribe’. 
Hierarchical Systems Theory (HST) thereby clarifies why the structure of ‘speech acts’ (Austin, 1962; 
Searle, 1975) has led to overemphasis of the importance of intentional states in understanding consciousness 
and the mind and to confusion as to the origin and underlying function of mental states. Indeed, HST makes 
sense of the fact that all category 2 animals demonstrate ‘world to word’, and ‘word to world’ ‘direction of 
fit’ in their communications, (Anscombe, 1957; Searle, 1983) but clarifies that the utterances and gestures of 
animals are related merely to feelings and needs, rather than to the richer potential of concepts and desires, in 
the case of humans.
It is also the case that natural selection has responded to the benefits of communicating conceptualised 
reality by evolving highly sophisticated physiological adaptations to facilitate and enhance, and thereby take 
advantage, of language capabilities. 
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Inevitably, one must reevaluate the conclusions of Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993) and Greenfield & Savage-
Rumbaugh (1990, p. 540) that the “evolutionary root of human language” can be found in the “linguistic 
abilities of the great apes” and be critical of Leakey & Lewin (1992) who speculate that the cognitive 
foundation for human language is present in ape brains. Hierarchical Systems Theory falsifies the view that 
physiological characteristics are responsible for the emergence and development of language and offers the 
alternative that an evolving systems hierarchy drives the development of physiological evolution for each 
category. Indeed, the application of the systems hierarchy model to the research shows a clear unifying 
distinction and a coherent explanation: Category 2 consciousness processes compel apes and immature 
human infants to communicate only innate responses and emotionally motivated attitudes, whilst category 3 
processes, additionally, compel mature humans to communicate conceptualised reality.
Why are phenomenal properties ineffable?
For an individual to be aware of the conscious state is to be aware of the phenomena of learning and feeling 
but not of the mechanisms behind learning and feeling. This provides the explanation to point 2.1.3 of 
Carruthers' requirements of an adequate reductive explanation of phenomenal experience; namely, why the 
properties distinctive of phenomenal consciousness can seem to their subjects to be ineffable or 
indescribable: 
Higher-order thought (HOT) processes (Carruthers, 2000b notably section 7 on dispositionalist HOT; 
Pharoah, 2008; Rosenthal, 2002) generate a perspective that has no means of either accessing category 1 
processes, which organise the structure of its complex biochemical mechanisms or category 2 processes, 
whose first-order representations (c.f. Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995 for FOR theories) generate its sensations and 
feelings (Carruthers, 2000b).
This does little to deter individuals from trying to conceptualise the phenomenon of their experiences, which 
include bodily functions, sensations, emotions, and consciousness itself. In conclusion to such cogitations, an 
individual might come to define sensations as, for example, ‘introspectively accessible phenomenal 
experiences that are irreducible’ and yet this conceptual definition provides no clue as to what sensations 
actually feel like or what they are, exactly. Inevitably, despite the familiarity of phenomenal experience and 
consciousness, conceptual identification remains elusive. This is clearly demonstrated by the commentary on 
thought experiments like that of Nagel’s "Bat" (1974) and Jackson's "Mary" (1986) (c.f. Dennett's 'The 
Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies', 1995b).
The relationship between stable concepts of reality and social cohesion
One of the key characteristics of a system state is its tendency toward stability. This is not surprising: If the 
interdependent parts of a system cause instability, the continuing survival of the system state is jeopardised. 
A system state is defined by the component stability of its dynamic parts.
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Equally, a category 3 system state seeks a stable concept of reality. When a concept does not conform to the 
reality of its learning and experiential evaluations, the stability of that system concept is compromised. And 
yet, an individual is compelled to reevaluate its concepts of reality in response to everyday experiences, 
contemplations, and during the communication of language.
Contemplation and discussion always challenge the stability of concepts about reality. Importantly, every 
individual’s concept of reality includes the individual’s stable interpretation of self. Consequently, there is 
the tendency for contemplation and discussion to feel like a challenge to the 'self-concept'. Inevitably, 
individuals are prone to be extremely protective of their perspective of reality and to be eager to maintain 
stable concepts however absurd they may be shown to be. Propositioning others with novel concepts and 
ideas is a challenge because existing and well-guarded concepts need first to be 'gently' dismantled or, more 
typically, incorporated.
The concepts of individuals incorporate family, tribal, and social beliefs and ideals. In these situations, 
concepts are not so much derived from the interpretation of experience, but from the unquestioning 
absorption of the feelings associated with culture, beliefs and ideals. Individuals are compelled to protect the 
ideals and the beliefs of their affiliated groups. Concepts derived from group affiliation are particularly 
potent. The reevaluation of an individual’s concept of reality, can generate both positive and negative 
conclusions that fuel individual and societal creativity, bias, and prejudice. 
Prejudice and creativity are symptomatic of the reinterpretation of realisations, and evoke the experiences 
and behaviours that are unique to human societies. Interestingly, under certain specific conditions, there may 
develop different classes of 'conceptual distortions' and divergence strategies to maintain conceptual stability. 
One could classify these distortions and their ensuing behaviours in terms of the relationship between 
concepts and the dynamics of affiliates category 1, 2 and 3 anomalies. This is a new science classification 
that requires study because it will lead to advances in psychological profiling and treatments, and to 
principles relating to group conflict and resolution.
Hierarchical Systems Theory is simple, unifying, and coherent
Hierarchical Systems Theory explains how ordered and disordered interaction between systems and their 
environments leads to an evolved hierarchy of systems structures. It also explains why these systems are 
self-regulatory. It is a simple and unified model that explains the dynamic that generates the phenomenon of 
experience, which humans identify as consciousness. It explains the systems hierarchy and mechanisms that 
coherently relate many characteristics such as replication, environmental information, phenomenal 
experience, and the phenomenon of conceptualised reality. In doing so, it satisfies Chalmers' principle of 
structural coherence (Criterion C),  which requires that the processes that explain awareness link structurally 
to the basis of consciousness by determining the relationship between that of which we are aware (and can 
report upon) and that of which we experience. 
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Furthermore, Hierarchical Systems Theory demonstrates an example of a Dowell (2007b) type-C 
physicalist’s reductive explanation of phenomenal experience by providing a structural link between that of 
which we are aware, which comprise of our conceptual representations, and that which we experience.
During the late Pliocene, about two and a half to three million years ago, the fourth evolutionary explosion 
began. The hominid category 2 brain may have initially developed in sophistication gradually because of the 
adaptive consequence of evolution and survival. But this incidental adaptation resulted in the emergence of 
category 3 mental processes. The benefits of conceptualising reality had a dramatic affect on cerebral 
expansion, physiological and neurological development, social dynamics, and the survival ethic of early 
hominids. The development of humankind and its unique identifying characteristics are the conclusion to the 
fourth evolutionary explosion where conceptual evolution rather than biological evolution has taken 
precedence.
But HST has even more to offer:
By extrapolation, one can ascertain the nature and mechanisms behind the next evolutionary stage - The 
future evolutionary stage to which humankind is heading. 
What is that future state?
5.4 Systems Category 4. 
Future States
A category 3 human that is actively aware of consciousness has a neural mechanism that enables it to modify 
its understandings in an ordered manner. This occurs when a systems structure is compelled to formulate 
conceptual relations regarding its environmental knowledge.
The key points from the previous category 3 section are that,
1. Systems that are aware of consciousness, construct concepts based on extrinsic relationships 
between known properties.
2. The underlying function of the category 3 awareness mechanism is to maintain stable concepts 
about reality. 
3. Concepts do not have to be constructed using verbal language. A concept can be based on any 
relationship between comparable types of information. 
4. One of the by-products of the mechanism is creativity. 
5. The construction of a conceptual realisation is what compels a human to formulate any suitable 
grammatical framework that can effectively communicate conceptualised relations.
25
6. An individual’s languages develop in response to its maturing concepts and their descriptive 
relevance.
7. An individual will defend its concept of reality with mental and physical vigour.
8. Concepts need not be derived solely from the interpretation of experience, but are necessarily 
derived from feelings relating to group cultures, beliefs and ideals.
Is human awareness of consciousness an end point in the evolution of mind?
According to Hierarchical Systems Theory, there is scope for the evolution of a future category 4 state. This 
is evident when one extrapolates from the underlying principles of HST. To do so, requires that one must 
consider what the defining features of the future state to which the human mind might evolve could be?
Notably, each category develops a specific and unique characteristic that is not controlled by the mechanics 
of the systems category. That the characteristic grants the system in each category some kind of advantage 
however, means that there is an evolutionary precedent. When a system then evolves such that its structure is 
capable of controlling the nature of that unique characteristic, that systems design acquires a new and 
powerful functional construct, a construct that can maximise the system's structural advantages. 
Unsurprisingly, that construct then becomes the formative dynamic in the evolution of entirely new 
physiological features and functional behaviours.
In order to determine what future category 4 will be therefore, one must look at the unique characteristics of 
category 3 humans, and ask the following  questions:
1. What unique category 3 characteristic is being acquired in a manner that is not controlled by the 
mechanics of the systems category?
2. Has this characteristic evolved in complexity over generations and has it got the potential to form a 
systems construct that could lead to a 5th evolutionary explosion? 
3. What will be the defining qualities of this future construct?
4. In what way will it influence humanity?
1. What unique category 3 characteristic is being acquired in a disordered manner?
The Hierarchical Systems Theory tells us that the next systems category will evolve out of the unique human 
category 3 system, and that this new category 4 will take the form of a once passive category 3 process and 
make it both active and fundamental to the structure of the new system. Therefore, in order to find out the 
possible features of the future category 4 construct, one needs to ask what specific 'class' of concepts about 
reality have been evolving outside of purposeful human control within the category 3 system?
For example, one might propose that creativity is a possible candidate. After all, creativity is a unique 
characteristic of category 3 humans. But creativity is not a concept so much as a category by-product. Its 
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equivalent in category 2 is learning. But like learning, creativity cannot be the unique characteristic at the 
heart of the evolution of the future category 4.
One might suggest science. But science concerns itself with identifying applications of proof in the search 
for applicable definitions for objective reality.  As such, there is no developmental construct to the discipline 
of science.
Should we look at an ethereal concept, like 'love'? It is true that love is a central theme to many religions. 
The problem with the candidate love is that it does not appear to be progressive. It is not an evolving 
concept. Indeed, it is a concept that has a tendency to seek to defy objectivity, to resist definition, and to 
hanker to the inexplicably primitive rather than to develop.
Morality is a conceptual construct that is in flux as it evolves under the auspices of religion, philosophical 
contemplation, and our individual sense of human value. The morality of our times is very different to that 
say found in the Old Testament or in the teachings of the ancient Greeks, or even across present day cultural 
boundaries and countries. Everyday, individuals deliberate their moral inclinations to instruct their responses 
to daily consideration. At the heart of morality is a sense that there is a profound aspirational wisdom that 
might help instruct all human deliberations and actions.
2. Has morality the potential to form a systems construct that could lead to a 5th evolutionary 
explosion?
Given that morality might be a potential candidate as a systems construct for category 4, what could possibly 
evolve accidentally from morality concepts that would lead to a unique active and ordered systems state? 
One can assume that certain individual humans have glimpsed this understanding, just as some category 2 
apes might have had emerging revelations of concepts about reality. But like some apes, these human 
individuals have been unable to grasp the essence of the construct and to imbue human conscience with a 
stable construct from which all of humanity could actively partake. But the sense that some higher wisdom 
of morality might include all-embracing visions of a consuming tranquil love is indication that there might 
be further revelations to our moral understanding. Morality has evolved over millennia and it certainly has 
the capability of developing a profoundly powerful systems construct. 
As a construct for future category 4, one would not recognise the concept of morality in the way humans 
currently understand and relate to it. Personally, I think of this new understanding and redefinition as a 
'moral-wisdom' that binds with 'practical wisdom'. What is artistic, scientific, religious, and philosophical 
endeavour, if it is not about finding a path to wisdom? This is the driving force behind our creative urges. 
Humanity just has not realised this to be the case. As a category 3 construct, wisdom has been acquired 
passively because wisdom is a disordered consequence of our creative activities. As a category 4 imperative, 
this future humanity will actively seek a stable 'wisdom'.
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3. What will be the defining qualities of this future construct?
The seeking of a stable wisdom will lead to the end to intolerance, to the justification of all proper action, to 
a founding classification of social cohesion, to an understanding of boundless endemic creativity, to the end 
of improper goals. It will lead to rapid access to the resolution of internal and social group conflict and to an 
understanding of how to evaluate progress and to determine what humanity wants from progress.
4. In what way will a category 4 state influence humanity?
A category 3 human that is actively aware of its conscious state has a cognitive mechanism that enables it to 
evaluate its behaviour through conceptual appraisal. Whilst assessing the intentions and effects of its 
behaviour, an individual develops concepts with which it can make definitive judgments. The 
communication of these considerations in a societal context leads to the development of values. Any 
particular family of values are based on separate but interacting sets of principles categorised, for example, 
in the morality of religion, law, ethics, and personal considerations of free will. These frequently are in 
conflict with one another creating conceptual and behavioural paradoxes. This indicates that the evolution of 
morality has been a disordered by-product of passive category 3 processes. It is an exciting prospect that this 
autopoietic process and consequential social attitudes and behaviours indicate that human moral conscience 
exists and evolves within the bounds of a unified construct that obeys fundamental dynamic systems 
principles. A category 4 state will, theoretically, involve the acquisition of an intentionally structured ethical 
discourse bound by a fundamental wisdom. This should lead, theoretically, to an explosion in human 
behavioural and physiological development.
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